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lives is, for the first time, clearly present in a 
legally binding instrument—the CCM. Adopt-
ing its view will inform and help shape the re-
sponses necessary to ensure that its purpose is 
furthered—namely, reducing the harm caused 
by cluster munitions. 
See Endnotes, page 111
by stating: “Each State Party shall” provide 
victim assistance (emphasis added).
The significant differences between the 
Ottawa Convention and Convention on Clus-
ter Munitions are due in large part to the ex-
istence of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, which represents 
another dot in the line connecting weapons 
treaties and human rights.9 It had a profound 
effect on the understanding of victim assis-
tance because it outlined a rights-based ap-
proach to disability, which provides a much 
more progressive, holistic view than previ-
ously existed. The key to creating a permanent 
change in the way weapons treaties are devel-
oped and implemented is to acknowledge that 
the people are at the core of treaties. The CCM 
is much closer to recognizing this than the 
Ottawa Convention, which itself was seen as 
taking an unprecedented leap in the way vic-
tims of weapons were addressed when it was 
drafted in 1997.
Conclusion
While it is important to recognize the sig-
nificance of the CCM in taking the concept 
of victim assistance into the 21st century, it is 
necessary to keep in mind the missing dots re-
quired to address the full spectrum of victims’ 
rights. One example is in the context of small 
arms and light weapons, where no provisions 
“Raising the Voices Against Cluster Munitions” survivor Corps trainers and training participants, who are persons with 
disabilities, including conflict survivors. Livingstone, Zambia.
on victim assistance have been articulated yet. 
It is also necessary to give some serious thought 
to the potential for a general legal framework 
that addresses the rights of victims of conflict. 
The shift in paradigms toward understand-
ing the rights of various victims and groups of 
victims in addressing issues that affect their 
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O n 30 May in Dublin, Ireland, 107 countries participating in the Oslo Process agreed to the text of a new convention that bans virtually all existing cluster munitions. Using some of 
the language of the Ottawa Mine-ban Convention, and led by many of 
the same advocates who pushed for that convention more than 10 years 
ago, the CCM represents the possibility that we will see a new global 
norm against the use of cluster munitions, with stockpiles eliminated, 
lands cleared and victims assisted. Whether and how that comes 
about, however, may be determined in a separate process held 
within the Geneva-based Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons.3 Negotiators there are working to create a separate 
cluster munitions protocol that could have the backing of the 
world’s major stockpilers of cluster munitions, such as China, 
India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States, most of 
whom have thus far remained outside the Oslo Process.
Interoperability and Definition: Oslo Compromises
The text agreed to in Dublin requires the destruction of all 
cluster munitions (as defined by the Convention) within eight 
years and the clearance of all areas afflicted with unexploded 
cluster submunition remnants within 10 years. Extensions may 
be requested if these deadlines cannot be met. The accord also 
includes measures for international assistance to victims of 
cluster munitions. Countries were able to sign the Convention 
beginning in December, 2000, and it will enter into force six 
months after 30 governments sign and ratify it.2
Many advocates and government representatives celebrat-
ed the conclusion of the CCM. In his 30 May closing state-
ment, Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin said, 
“I am … convinced that together we will have succeeded in 
stigmatizing any future use of cluster munitions.”4 Cluster 
Munition Coalition Co-chair Steve Goose noted that it “can only be 
characterized as an extraordinary convention, one that is certain to 
save thousands and thousands of civilian lives for decades to come.”5
If as strong an international consensus develops around cluster 
munitions as has developed around anti-personnel landmines, such 
predictions may come true. During the CCM negotiations, however, 
compromises were made—notably on interoperability and the defini-
tion of cluster munitions—in order to maintain the support of a num-
ber of key countries. These compromises opened the door to future 
cluster use. 
Will Oslo be the Next Ottawa? 
The Cluster-munitions Debate
by Jeff Abramson [ Arms Control Association ]
More than a decade has passed since the monumental Ottawa Mine Ban Convention1 was opened for 
signature in December 1997. Now, with the adoption of the text of the Convention on Cluster Munitions2 in May 
2008, the global community is closer than ever to an international agreement prohibiting the use of cluster 
munitions. A review of the key issues underpinning the debate on cluster munitions follows.  
A major question going into the Dublin conference was whether eventu-
al CCM States Parties would be able to cooperate militarily with nonmember 
States Parties that maintain cluster munitions. Because the current policy 
of the United States is to retain the right to use certain cluster munitions, 
the desire to maintain interoperability put U.S. allies in a particularly diffi-
cult position.6 Although abstaining from the Oslo Process, the United States 
exerted pressure on its participants regarding the interoperability issue. 
During a press briefing in the initial days of the Dublin meeting, Acting 
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Stephen D. Mull 
repeated U.S. interoperability arguments that the draft convention could 
be read as calling for the criminalization of military cooperation between 
eventual member and nonmember states. Because U.S. ships carry cluster 
munitions, he further extended the argument to say that U.S. disaster re-
lief and humanitarian assistance could be cut off, raising the stakes for the 
global community. Mull also said that “a much more effective way to go 
about this is to pursue technological fixes that will make sure that these 
weapons are no longer viable once the conflict is over.”7
Using some of the language of 
the Ottawa Mine-ban Convention, 
and led by many of the same ad-
vocates who pushed for that con-
vention more than 10 years ago, 
the CCM represents the possibility 
that we will see a new global norm 
against the use of cluster munitions, 
with stockpiles eliminated, lands 
cleared and victims assisted.
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To address interoperability concerns, Article 21 was 
added, specifically clarifying “relations with states not 
party to this convention.” It permits military cooperation 
even when cluster munitions are used, as long as member 
states do not “expressly request the use of cluster muni-
tions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within 
its exclusive control.” 2 This rather broad exemption made 
it easier for U.S. allies to support the convention, as the 
United Kingdom dramatically did on 28 May when Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown issued a statement that said, “In 
order to secure as strong a convention as possible in the last 
hours of negotiation, we have issued instructions that we 
should support a ban on all cluster bombs, including those 
currently in service by the UK.”8
A separate concession on the definition of cluster mu-
nitions partially reflects U.S. preference for technological 
improvements instead of an outright ban. In Article 2, ne-
gotiators exempted munitions that “avoid indiscriminate 
area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submuni-
tions” by requiring that no more than nine explosive sub-
munitions be included in a cluster munition and that each 
of them meet the following characteristics: 
•	 Weigh more than four kilograms (8.8 pounds) and 
less than 20 kilograms (44.09 pounds). 
•	 Be designed to detect and engage a single target. 
•	 Be equipped with an electronic self-destruct mech-
anism and an electronic self-deactivating feature. 
According to most experts, no cluster munitions that 
have been used in combat to date would meet this stringent 
definition.9 Others, however, such as the German-produced 
SMArt-155, which has only two submunitions, would meet 
the requirements.10 Whether countries will choose to in-
vest in the more expensive cluster-like weapons or convert 
existing weapons to meet the new standards remains to be 
seen. Still, such weapons would be a vast improvement over 
older cluster munitions that have maimed or killed thou-
sands of noncombatants to date.11 
Military Utility Remains Sticking Point
Estimating the size of the global stockpile is difficult; 
the United States itself maintains more than 700 mil-
lion cluster submunitions.12 The definitional compromise 
reached in Dublin reflects the fact that many countries still 
claim that cluster munitions have military utility. Short-
ly after the conclusion of the accord, the U.S. Defense De-
partment clarified U.S. cluster-munition policy, stating, 
“There remains a military requirement to engage area targets that include massed 
formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets 
whose precise locations are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets. Clus-
ter munitions can be the most effective and efficient weapons for engaging these types 
of targets.”6
Although the argument is made that 21st-century warfare is not based on combat-
ing tank formations and indirect area targets, countries possessing the vast majority 
of global cluster stockpiles did not sign onto the CCM. Even though his country did 
so, Danish Ambassador Bent Wigotski said, “Countries possessing more than 90 per-
cent of the world stockpiles do not take part in the Oslo Process and have no inten-
tion of acceding to the convention. … Any comparison with the Ottawa Convention is 
misleading. Cluster munitions are much more important [than landmines] for a num-
ber of countries, constituting a very significant part of their firepower.”13
CCW Process will be Important
Instead, many major cluster-munitions producers and stockpilers—including 
China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States—have stayed out of the 
Oslo Process in favor of the CCW, which is designed to address weapons that are 
deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. As the Oslo Process 
was launched, countries participating in the CCW opted to begin negotiations on the 
weapons. Those discussions are conducted primarily by the CCW Group of Govern-
ment Experts on Protocol V, which entered into force 12 November 2006, and covers 
explosive remnants of war, of which cluster munitions that remain unexploded after 
the end of a conflict are a subset. 
The successful conclusion of the CCM should put added pressure on the countries 
participating in the CCW to reach a new accord for a “Protocol VI”14 on cluster muni-
tions by a November 2008 meeting of CCW States Parties. Even though many of those 
countries also participated in the Oslo Process, any agreement that comes out of the 
CCW is unlikely to include as sweeping a limitation on cluster munitions as the CCM. 
As of the writing of this article, exactly what that protocol might entail is still unclear. 
Rather than simply calling for a blanket restriction on cluster-munitions use, the July 
draft allows for military purposes and relies on avoiding “incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, [and] damage to civilian objects, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”15 In September, 
delegates discussed prohibiting the use of some cluster munitions and the chairper-
son’s draft circulated near the conclusion of that meeting presented multiple options 
for determining what types of cluster munitions might be prohibited, relying heavily 
on technical improvements.16
Although many advocates would prefer that these countries sign onto the Oslo-
inspired convention, the CCW could still serve to further an international norm that 
dramatically reduces the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. Most of the world’s 
major producers and stockpilers of anti-personnel landmines, including China, India, 
Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States, are bound by CCW Amended Protocol 
II.17 That agreement does not ban landmines but does provide important humanitar-
ian restrictions on their use and requirements for self-destruct mechanisms and de-
tectability. The combination of the Ottawa Convention and CCW Protocol II has led 
to a virtual ban on new deployments of anti-
personnel mines, evidenced in part by the lack 
of U.S. deployment of such weapons in Afghani-
stan and Iraq.18 A new CCW Protocol VI could 
provide a similar mechanism for those coun-
tries not ready to completely forswear use of 
cluster munitions.
Assessing Future Progress
A number of indicators will provide clues 
as to what kind of global norm is being estab-
lished—an effective ban on use of cluster mu-
nitions or a more general humanitarian effort 
to assist victims and clear impacted areas. For 
both the CCM and a CCW protocol, the num-
ber of countries signing and the pace of their 
submission of articles of ratification will be 
early measures.
The interaction of eventual CCM member 
states with nonmember states, especially con-
cerning storage of cluster munitions at foreign 
bases, also promises to be noteworthy. CCM 
advocates have called for eventual States Par-
ties to ask allies to remove cluster munitions 
from any bases on a CCM member’s territory. 
U.K. officials have indicated that they intend 
to ask the United States to remove any cluster 
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Until a new gap in usage develops, it will 
be difficult to judge whether the weapons 
themselves are becoming anathema.
munitions that might be on U.K. territory by 
the end of the eight-year stockpile-destruction 
deadline. Other countries have suggested that 
they are studying the issue or find no basis for 
third-party stockpile removal.13 If a trend de-
velops that pressures the United States or oth-
er expected nonmembers to remove cluster 
stockpiles for member territory, it would indi-
cate that a norm around the CCM is growing, 
leading to more dramatic action than that po-
tentially agreed to in the CCW. 
Although cluster munitions themselves are 
not commonly used weapons, there is strong 
evidence that Georgia and Russia utilized 
them against each other in August 2008.19,20 
Previously, there had been a two-year gap since 
cluster munitions were last employed in com-
bat. In 2006 Israel fired cluster munitions into 
Lebanon during hostilities that summer, with per-
haps one million submunitions failing to explode 
initially. The terrorist group Hezbollah reportedly 
fired other cluster munitions into northern Israel 
that same year.21 (The subsequent humanitarian 
outcry helped spark Norway to launch the Oslo 
Process apart from the CCW.) Until a new gap in 
usage develops, it will be difficult to judge whether 
the weapons themselves are becoming anathema. 
The future is, of course, difficult to predict; 
nonetheless, it is reasonable to believe that the 
world will see less use of cluster munitions and 
more relief to those who have suffered due to 
these indiscriminant weapons. 
See Endnotes, page 111
Portions of this article are drawn from the 
author’s earlier work, “107 Countries Approve 
Cluster Munitions Treaty,” published in the July/
August 2008 edition of Arms Control Today, 
available online at http://tinyurl.com/6ckvqv. 
Coroner criticizes British MoD for paratrooper’s death in minefield rescue
On 6 September 2006, Cpl. Mark Wright, of Edinburgh, Scotland, was killed by a landmine blast while trapped in an unmarked 
Afghan minefield. Six of his paratrooper comrades were also injured. During a hearing regarding Wright’s death, coroner 
Andrew Walker openly criticized the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, remarking that the troops in Afghanistan during 
the incident did not have access to the proper equipment and resources required for a safe minefield-rescue operation. 
Wright and his platoon of paratroopers became stranded inside the minefield after a sniper in their platoon strayed into 
the unmarked area and was injured by an explosion. According to the coroner, the blast that killed Wright was set off by 
the downdraft from an RAF Chinook helicopter that was being used for the rescue. The Chinook was not equipped with a 
winch that the trapped troops had requested, and after realizing that the Chinook could set off another landmine explosion, 
the paratroopers waved away the helicopter. As it departed, a landmine was set off and exploded, striking Wright. Two U.S. 
Blackhawk helicopters equipped with winches came later and rescued the troops. Wright died while on board one of the 
helicopters. A head official from the military’s Joint Helicopter Command denied that the helicopter had set off the blast. 
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